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Abstract

While it takes traditional internet worms hours to infect all the vulnerable hosts on the
Internet, a flash worm takes seconds. Because of the rapid rate with which flash worms
spread, the existing worm defense mechanisms cannot respond fast enough to detect and
stop the flash worm infections.

In this project, we propose a geometric-based detection mechanism that can detect the
spread of flash worms in a short period of time. We tested the mechanism on various
simulated flash worm traffics consisting of more than 10,000 nodes. In addition to testing
on flash worm traffics, we also tested the mechanism on non-flash worm traffics to see if
our detection mechanism produces false alarms.

In order to efficiently analyze bulks of various network traffics, we implemented an
application that can be used to convert the network traffic data into graphical notations.
Using the application, the analysis can be done graphically as it displays the large amount
of network relationships as tree structures.
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1. Introduction

From the early computing days, many computer worms have been developed and
spread on the Internet, often causing disruptions on the network. As computer network
architecture and internet security continue to advance to prevent the spread of worms, the
worms, too, continue to evolve as well to find their ways to infect more hosts in reduced
infection time.
In recent years, due to faster internet connections and higher computing power available,
it is now possible to develop a more powerful computer worm that can possibly bring down
the whole Internet in less than 30 seconds [8]. Such a worm is termed a “Flash Worm”, and
this master’s project will consider a possible defense against flash worms.
To date, flash worms are only theoretical in the sense that no reported incidents have
been filed. However, one conjectured implementation of a flash worm is to pre-scan the
entire Internet to generate a hit-list of all potentially vulnerable hosts. The initial worm
divides the hit-list into n blocks, infects one address from each block, and then
communicates the list of remaining addresses for each block to newly infected host [2].
This process continues until all the addresses on the hit-list have been infected. Similar to
the Slammer worm, which is capable of infecting “more than 90 percent of vulnerable hosts
within 10 minutes” [6], the flash worm effectively utilizes network bandwidth; the higher
the bandwidth, the faster the worm spreads. However, in contrast to the Slammer worm,
this flash worm implementation does not scan for vulnerable target addresses while
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spreading. Since searching for vulnerable target addresses is a slow process, eliminating
this process allows the unprecedented spread rate of flash worms.
Because of the rapid speed with which a flash worm spreads, some of the prediction and
mitigation algorithms applicable to other worms are not appropriate for flash worms. In
this project, we are proposing a new geometry-based detection algorithm of flash worms, in
which the local network activity is monitored. Based on the monitored activity, we plan to
create a tree to indicate the spread of a possible flash worm. This “spread tree” is designed
to detect the tree-like structure a flash worm is likely to use to propagate the target host list.
If the depth of a spread tree reaches some predefined threshold, shutting down the network
will prevent the flash worm from spreading further. To avoid false alarms, the spread tree
must be pruned as well as updated continuously.
In the rest of this paper, we first describe the known conjectured implementations of
flash worm. Section 2 discusses the essential components of flash worm implementation
structure. Section 2 also explains how differentiating these components can result in
different infection behaviors. Section 3 details the design and implementation of our
proposed detection method. Section 4 shows our simulation test processes and the result.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the project.

1.1. Contribution of this project paper to the field
This paper provides a perspective of the various flash worm implementation
scenarios. It also discusses how we implemented our simulation of flash worm
infections. While many large-scale worm simulators are implemented by utilizing a
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worm model, our simulator is implemented to produce the packet-level data traffic
among 10,000 network hosts. Furthermore, the paper proposes an effective flash
worm detection algorithm and explains how we visualized the vast amounts of flash
worm data using a post-analyzer.
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2. Background

Because there have been no incidents of flash worm outbreaks reported in the wild yet,
there is no solid example of an actual flash worm implementation. However, there are
many conjectured implementations of flash worms by various researchers.

2.1. Common Structure of Flash Worms
Despite the differences, every flash worm implementation is expected to have the
following common components:

•

Hit-list
While traditional internet worms scan for target hosts whenever they infect a
new host, flash worms do not perform this often time-consuming process.
Instead, flash worms utilize a hit-list, which contains the list of all the target
host addresses.
o Hit-list preparation process
Prior to instantiating the spread of flash worms, the worm author has to
scan the entire Internet address to determine the vulnerable hosts. If the
author has a fast Internet connection and a high processing power, this
scanning can be done in a day. However, to reduce the risk of being
detected by defense systems, the author may want to purposely slow

10

down the scanning process. Such stealthy scanning may take several
weeks.

o Typical size of one Host Address
Since most of the network hosts are in IPv4 domain at this time, the usual
number of bytes required to represent one host address is 32. That means,
a single UDP packet can store about 35 host addresses if the maximum
byte size of a UDP packet is 1200.

o Low failed infection attempts
In addition to the boost of spread speed, the use of the hit-list also protects
flash worms from some existing worm containment defenses. For
example, the containment defenses that look for unusually high number of
missed connections cannot detect the spread of flash worms because most
infection attempts are likely to succeed.

•

Maximum infection number
Given a list of addresses to infect, each host does not infect all the listed
addresses. Instead, each host attempts to infect a fixed number of addresses at
most and propagates the remaining addresses to other hosts.
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•

`Spread Tree
Even though the usage of the hit-list enables the blazing spread rate of flash
worms, it also restricts the flash worms to spread following a tree-like pattern.
We call this spread pattern the spread tree. For example, the hit-list of Fig. 1 (a)
with maximum infection number of 3 creates the spread tree shown in Fig. 1 (b).

<Fig. 1: Hit-list and 2 Corresponding Spread Trees>
(a) The hit-list contains 11 target addresses; (b) The spread tree formulation if each node attempts to
infect 3 other nodes at most; (c) Each node infects 5 nodes at most. Note that only node 1 has the enough
target addresses to infect 5 nodes.

To help us analyze the flash worm infection behavior later, let us define some
important components of spread trees:
o Parent-Child relationship


There is a one-to-one parent-child relationship if one host infects
another host. For example, in Fig (b) above, node 6 is a parent
of node 7, and node 7 is a child of node 6.

o Depth (or Generation) number

12



The depth of a node is the maximum length of the path from the
root to the node. For example, in Fig (b), node 7 has depth of 2
and node 10 has depth of 1.



The depth can also be called generation number. For example, in
Fig (b), nodes 2, 6, and 10 are all in the same first generation.



The maximum number of generations required to infect N hosts
if each host infects K other hosts can be determined by this
formula:
¾ O(logK N)
For example, in Fig (b), the maximum generation number is
O(log3 11) = 3.

o Node creation (or infection) time


Each node has its associated creation time. This is the time the
node was first infected by a flash worm. Note that the nodes
from a same generation should have similar creation time since
they are expected to be infected at about the same time.

o Total infection time


The total infection time is the amount of time required to infect
all the hosts listed in a hit-list. The total infection time can also
be equivalent to the node creation time of the last leaf node.
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2.2. Various design issues of flash worms

When designing a flash worm, the worm author has to take the following issues into
the account as they will characterize the worm infection behavior:

2.2.1. Spread Tree Topology
The maximum number of infections each host attempts defines the shape of the
spread tree. The authors of [7], who first published the work regarding flash worms,
have laid out these three spread tree topologies.

2.2.1.1. Shallow Spread Tree
In a shallow spread tree topology, each host tries to infect many other hosts.
As can be seen in Fig. 2 below, it takes 3 generations to infect 155 hosts if
each host attempts to infect 5 other hosts.

14

<Fig. 2: Shallow Spread Tree Topology>

Advantage:
It takes a short amount of time to infect all the target hosts since this
topology requires a small number of generations to infect many hosts.
Having a couple of hosts with OC-12 connection near at the root node, [8]
claims that such a shallow spread tree can infect all the vulnerable hosts on
the Internet less than 1 second.
Furthermore, this topology is tolerant against a failed infection. A
network host may not get infected by a flash worm for many reasons. The
host may no longer have a security hole, or the infection packet may be lost.
The problem is if a host is not infected, the hosts constituting its child nodes
in the spread tree will not get infected either. Fortunately, the shallow
spread tree topology is tolerant against such infection failures. For example,
in the Fig. 2 above, suppose one host from first generation fails to get
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infected. Then, that means, only 1 out of 5 failed and we still have 4 other
hosts to continue the infections.

Disadvantage:
As each host tries to infect many other hosts, this topology places
significant computation burden on each host. Furthermore, the traditional
worm defense systems which look for sudden increase in the number of
network connections from a host may detect the worm activities.

2.2.1.2. Deep Spread Tree
In a deep spread tree topology, each host tries to infect only a small number
of other hosts. If we were to infect the same 155 hosts again using the deep
spread tree topology from Fig 3, it would require 7 generations this time.
Recall that the previously discussed shallow spread tree would require only
3 generations.
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<Fig. 3: Deep Spread Tree Topology>

Advantage:
Since each host infects a small number of other hosts, the
aforementioned defense systems, which look for sudden increase in the
number of network connections, cannot be effective against this topology.

Disadvantage:
When comparing to the shallow spread tree topology, this topology
requires more generations to infect the same target hosts. Since there is a
propagation delay in sending the target list from a generation to the next,
more generations imply longer propagation delay. Therefore, this topology
takes long time to infect all the target addresses.
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Furthermore, if one node from the early generation fails to get infected,
the impact can be devastating. For example, in the Fig 3 above, if one node
from generation 1 fails to get infected, the half of the spread tree would not
get infected.

♦ Notes regarding our design ( I )
The flash worm detection mechanism, which we propose in this paper, is
effective only for this deep spread tree topology because the mechanism
requires to see the spread tree grow to reach a certain depth.

2.2.1.3. Robust Spread Tree
One of the difficulties of implementing flash worms is to obtain a perfect
hit-list. Since the Internet continues to change as new hosts are being added
and deleted, some infection attempts may fail. As discussed in the deep
spread tree topology section, if an infection attempt fails near at the root of
the spread tree, the half of the spread tree may not be infected.
To provide a degree of resilience to the failed infection attempts, the
following topology can be used.
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<Fig. 4: Robust Spread Tree Topology>

In this robust topology, each host tries to infect its neighbor’s child hosts.
Even though this redundancy may consume additional network bandwidth
and processing power, it protects from a failed parent node to decide the fate
for all of its child nodes.

2.2.2. Use of Threads
In addition to defining the spread tree topology, the flash worm author should
decide whether to use threads. The use of threads at the application layer can
impact the total infection time.

2.2.2.1. No Thread
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If a thread is not used, then a host has to wait until it receives all the target
addresses from its parent. Until the receiving is completed, the host cannot
infect other hosts.
The hosts near at the root node are expected to wait the longest because the
target address list is usually huge. On the other hand, as the host is closer to
the leaf nodes, the waiting time is expected to be significantly reduced.

♦ Notes regarding our design ( II )
Our simulation implementation of flash worms does not use thread.
Therefore, there are propagation delays which vary with respect to the size
of the target list.

2.2.2.2. Single Thread
In an implementation that can utilize a single thread, the host can create an
instance of thread to infect its child node immediately after a target address
is received. The Fig. 5 illustrates the procedure.
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<Fig. 5: Single Thread Usage>
(a) At t0, the root node infects one other node; (b) At t1, the root node infects second node. The previous child
node has received a target address from the root node and is ready to infect another node. The node infects
another node by creating a thread. (Note that the node is still receiving the target list from its parent); (c) At t3,
three new nodes are infected; (d) At t6, all nodes are infected. [2]

By using a single thread, a node does not have to wait until it receives all the
target address, which significantly reduces the total infection time.

2.2.2.3. Multiple Threads
Multiple threads can be used in the environment where a node receives
multiple target addresses from multiple sources at the same time. For
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example, in a robust spread tree topology, a node may receive multiple
target addresses from different parent nodes.

2.2.3. TCP or UDP
Another important decision a flash worm author has to make is whether to
use TCP or UDP. TCP establishes and maintains a connection before
transmitting the data, which requires more packets to be sent than UDP. On the
other hand, UDP does not establish a connection and data can be transmitted
between two hosts right away. Therefore, a UDP-based flash worm can infect
faster than a TCP-based flash worm.
Even though the use of TCP can be slower than using UDP, the connectionoriented nature of TCP provides guaranteed delivery of data whereas UDP does
not provide this. As discussed in the spread tree topology section, missed
delivery of infection packets in the early stage of worm infection can have a huge
impact. Therefore, the worm author has to balance the infection speed against the
risk of missed connections when choosing the network transmission protocol.

♦ Notes regarding our design ( III )
Our simulation of flash worms uses UDP. Only one UDP packet is required
to infect a target host.
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2.3. New Flash Worm Implementation Design
There are many hypothetical implementation designs of flash worms known today.
However, there may be other flash worm implementation designs still unknown.
Below, we propose a new flash worm implementation design.
Central Hit-list Server based Design
•

Instead of distributing the address list from a parent node to a child node, the
hit-list is available from a central server.

•

When a new host is infected, it asks the central server for target addresses.
Once the central server receives a packet from a target address, it removes the
target address from the hit-list (because it knows that the target address is
already infected).

•

For simplicity and efficiency, every packet is in UDP. Assuming a UDP packet
can store 1200bytes, a single UDP packet can store about 35 IP Addresses. That
means, a simple Request-Reply UDP packets will get 35 target lists from the
server.

•

Advantage:
o The central server can efficiently distribute the hit-list


No more initial huge delay in propagating a large hit-list



Resilient to failed infections; if a node fails to get infected, other
node will infect its child nodes.
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o The hit-list can be updated dynamically as new vulnerable addresses are
added. Also, incorrect addresses can be removed after some timeout.
o The current infection progress state can be monitored in real time.
•

Disadvantage:
o The hit-list server can be heavily loaded.
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3. Implementation

In this section, we discuss how we implemented a simulator to generate the flash worm
traffic. Then, we discuss how we developed a new application to visualize and better
understand the flash worm traffic and to test our proposed detection mechanism.

3.1. Flash Worm Simulation
3.1.1. Finding a suitable simulator
In order to study the defense against flash worms, we needed to have a
simulator to simulate the behavior of flash worms. Because learning to use a new
simulator in depth is a difficult and often time-consuming process, we wanted to
verify that a specific simulator is capable of simulating many nodes and generating
the packet-level traffics prior to learning the simulator in depth.

List of Simulators:
Following are simulators that can simulate a vast number of nodes:
1) Scalable Simulation Framework
a. http://www.ssfnet.org/homePage.html
b. Outdated - Latest simulator update was in year 2004
2) Simnet
a. http://simnet1.isi.jhu.edu/
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b. The implementation of a worm model was available but the simulator
did not have documentation.
3) OPNET
a. http://www.opnet.com/
b. This is a commercial-quality network simulator product. Student
license was available that required a complex registration.
4) GTNetS
a. http://www.ece.gatech.edu/research/labs/MANIACS/GTNetS/
b. A network simulator from Georgia Tech University – complex to
install and use
5) NS-2
a. http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/
b. Although well documented, very complex to use.

Although it seemed to be very complex to use at first, we decided to use NS2 because it was easy to install and had some form of the user documentation.
However, the other simulators have the capability to do the project as well.

3.1.2. Extending simulator to simulate the spread of flash worms
3.1.2.1. Modified NS-2 default environments
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•

By default, NS-2 uses a flat-routing scheme, in which every node knows
the address of every other node, resulting in routing table size to the
order of n2 for n number of nodes. To reduce the memory requirement
of simulations over large network topologies, we created a hierarchicalrouting scheme. For hierarchical-routing, each node knows only about
those nodes in its level, thus the routing table size was reduced to the
order of log n.

3.1.2.2. Added a new network packet:
We enhanced NS-2 to support the following new network packet:
•

Packet Format
struct hdr_fworm {
nsaddr_t
dst;
nsaddr_t
src;
nsaddr_t
target_range_first;
nsaddr_t
target_range_last;
};

o There are four fields in the packet


dst = packet destination address



src = source address



target_range_first = first range of address to infect



target_range_last = last range of address to infects

o Instead of transmitting each target address of the hit-list, we
decided to send the range representing the list. So, a single
packet can infect and propagate the target addresses. The
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propagation delay to transmit the target addresses is simulated by
forcing infected host to wait for the estimated delay before
infecting other hosts. The delay varies with respect to the range
size.

3.1.2.3. Added two new network entities: Node and CenterNode
o An entity Node represents a host that is vulnerable to flash worm
infections.
o The entity CenterNode is a special node that is not vulnerable to flash
worm infections. It is located at the center of the network hierarchy, and
it acts as a router to forward flash worm packets amongst Nodes. Every
flash worm data has to go through this entity first. Since it can see all
the flash worm traffics, it is also the ideal place to implement our
detection mechanism.

3.1.2.4. Network Hierarchy Example
Fig. 6 displays an example of simulated network topology in NS-2.
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<Fig. 6: Network Topology of NS-2, consisting of two clusters>

o There is always one CenterNode in the topology, which has the address
0.0.0 and is located at the center.
o Every packet is sent to CenterNode first. Then, the CenterNode
forwards the packet to the correct destination.
o Each cluster can have maximum of 128 nodes.
o Of the address form 0.X.Y, X represents the cluster number and Y
represents the node ID within the cluster.
o A node with the address form of 0.X.0 is a head of the cluster.
o Both the CenterNode and the head of a cluster have enough buffer size
to handle heavy network traffics.

3.1.3. Configurable Parameters
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Following are the configurable parameters to simulate various flash worm
scenarios:
o Number of clusters


The simulator can support up to 100 clusters. Since each cluster
has 128 nodes, this means that the simulator can simulate 12,800
nodes.



Our simulation has been performed on a computer with 1GB of
RAM. A computer with higher RAM space should be able to
simulate more than 100 clusters.

o Infection number


This is the maximum number that each host tries to infect other
hosts.

o Link delay


There is a network propagation delay between the CenterNode
and the head of a cluster. Otherwise specified, we use 5ms as the
default delay.



There is also a network propagation delay between nodes and the
head of the nodes. Otherwise specified, we use 10ms as the
default delay.



If using the default delay values, the end-to-end propagation
delay between 2 hosts is 10 + 5 + 5 + 10 = 30 ms.
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3.2. Flash Worm Detection Mechanism

Since flash worms spread so fast, the traditional signature-based defenses or manual
human intervention cannot respond in enough time to stop the flash worm propagation.
Therefore, much effort has gone into designing automated flash worm containment
mechanisms. Besides the one we are proposing in this paper, there are other defense
mechanisms against flash worms.

3.2.1. Other defense mechanisms
3.2.1.1. Random Network Address
[1] proposes a defense system against flash worm in which the address of
the Internet hosts are changed frequently. By doing so, the goal is to make
the hit-list, which is pre-generated by the flash worm authors, unreliable and
useless. However, the mechanism requires a significant modification of the
existing Internet infrastructure.

3.2.1.2. Honeypot
Traditionally, a honeypot is a fake network environment where various
viruses and worms can be lured into a trap. If the address of a honeypot is in
the hit-list, attempting to infect the honeypot may prevent a part of the

31

spread tree to be infected. However, as discussed in the robust spread tree
topology section, there are ways to get around this trap.

3.2.2. Geometry-based Detection of Flash Worms
3.2.2.1. Basic Idea
The basic idea is to create a spread tree by monitoring network traffic
activities, and if a predefined threshold level of depth is reached, shutdown
the network. The spread tree is pruned periodically by removing the old
nodes so that the tree would not grow continuously and trigger false alarms.
By carefully choosing the threshold depth and the prune period, it should be
difficult to trigger the false alarm by non-flash worm packets.

3.2.3. Extending NS2 to simulate detection of flash worms
3.2.3.1. Node Structure
In order to create the spread tree, we use the following tree node structure:
•

Struct node {
int nodeID;
// ID (or address) of this node
int depth;
// depth (or generation) number
double timestamp; // node creation time
node ** children;
node ** parent;
int numChildren;
int numParent;
int maxChildren;
int maxParent;

//
//
//
//
//
//
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list of children
list of parents
number of children
number of parents
max number of children
max number of children

node * before;
node * after;

// for list sorted by time
// for list sorted by time

};



Note that our node implementation can support multiple parents.
This late added feature required more complex computation to be
performed dynamically. For example, it required the support of
parent-child loop avoidance and recursive depth determination which
are discussed below. If the node were to support only one parent, the
implementation could have been much simpler.

3.2.3.2. Double linked-list sorted by timestamp
To minimize the cost of updating the tree structure, we used the following
double linked-list sorted by timestamp:
o Linked-list
Remove
nodes starting
from head



Node 1

Node 6

Time: 10

Time: 13

Add new
nodes starting
from tail

By using this linked-list, there is no need to search for old nodes in
the pruning process.

3.2.3.3. Array of pointers to node sorted by Node ID
To allow us to easily access the node structure, we created an array of
pointers to node structure that is sorted by Node ID.
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o

Node * pNodes[size of max node];



For example, given the a nodeID X, we could access the node
structure by *pNodes[X]

3.2.3.4. Dynamic determination of root nodes
Through out the operation, there can be many splits or merges of spread
trees. For example, a tree is split if the root node is removed; two trees are
merged if one node infects one node on the other tree. Since it would be
very cumbersome to maintain a list of all the root nodes, we decided to
maintain no explicit list of root nodes. Instead, if the parent number of a
node is 0, the node is the root.

3.2.3.5. Dynamic determination of depth
Instead of updating the depth of every child node when the depth of a parent
node is changed, depth is determined recursively as following:


depth = maximum depth of parents + 1

3.2.3.6. Exiting Parent-Child relationship
If there is an existing parent-child relationship between two nodes when
creating a new relationship, we decided to do nothing. Alternatively, we could
have updated the node creation time so that the node would be pruned at a later
time. However, we thought doing so would consume significant computation
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power to reorganize the linked-list. For example, if two nodes are
communicating using a TCP connection or running some application, there
would be many rapid requests to update the node creation time in a short period
of time. Therefore, we decided that it would be better not to update the node
creation time.

3.2.3.7. Parent-Child Loop Avoidance
Before a new parent-child relationship is created, a check is performed to
prevent the formation of a parent-child loop. See Fig. 7 below.

<Fig. 7: Loop Avoidance>
(a) No loop; (b) There is a loop, connecting node 1,6, 8

In Fig 7(a), there is no loop. However, in Fig 7(b) there is a loop among the
nodes 1, 6, and 8. If there is a loop, we cannot determine the depth correctly
since we cannot determine which node is the parent/root node. Therefore, if
a new parent-child relation creates a loop, we remove that relationship right
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away. There can be potential attacks against this restriction, one of which
we discuss later.

3.2.4. Configurable Parameters
Similar to the configurable parameters in flash worm simulation, there are
configurable parameters for detection mechanism.

o Depth Threshold


This is the maximum number of depth allowed before an alarm is
triggered to notify that spread of flash worms has detected.



Too lower number is likely to generate many false alarms; too high
number would not detect flash worm early enough to react.

o Prune Period


This is the amount of time elapsed before next pruning occurs.

o Prune Amount


This is the amount of time we subtract from the current time, and any
nodes created before that time is pruned. For example, if Prune
Amount is 5 seconds and current time is 30 seconds, the nodes with
creation time less than 30 – 5 = 25 seconds will be removed from the
spread tree.
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3.3. Post-analyzer

In this section we discuss how we implemented a post-analyzer to help visualizing
the simulated result.

3.3.1. Nam
NS-2 provides Nam, which is a graphical utility to display the network topology
and simple network traffic activities. We have implemented Nam such that when a
node is infected, the color of the node changes to red. Following is a sample output
of running the simulation consisting of 10 nodes.
o nam result

<Fig. 8: Nam screen-shot>
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o Node0 is the CentralNode
o Nodes 1,2,3,4,6,7,9 have been infected at the time
o Nodes 5,8,10 have not been infected yet.
o This is a screen shot of a specific simulation time; eventually, every node
will get infected.
o Disadvantages:


If plotting a lot of nodes, Nam cannot position nodes evenly across
the screen. Nam will display all the nodes close to the CenterNode
and we will eventually see a big dark circle in the middle.



Nam cannot automatically order the nodes into a tree form.

3.3.2. Custom post-analyzer
To resolve all Nam’s shortcomings, we have implemented a custom postanalyzer using MFC from Microsoft Visual Studio. Following are the features of
the post-analyzer:
o Able to plot a vast number of nodes on a screen
o Able to zoom in (or out) to see detailed structure
o Able to see detailed information of a node when the mouse is placed over
the node


The information is displayed in a tooltip
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•

The information is consisted of node address, node creation
time, and depth. The tooltip can be easily modified to display
more information.

o Able to manually start, stop, and rerun the simulation at any time.
o Able to run the detection mechanism


The detection mechanism is implemented in both NS-2 and the postanalyzer. The detection mechanism in NS-2 can be used to monitor
the flash worm packets as soon as they are generated by the
simulator. However, the configurable parameter for the detection
mechanism such as Prune Period cannot be changed after the
simulator is started and the testing of the detection mechanism
always requires regeneration of flash worm traffic. On the other
hand using the post-analyzer, the configurable parameters of the
detection mechanism can be changed and tested at any time. The
post-analyzer can also apply the detection mechanism on saved flash
worm traffic so the flash worm traffic does not need to be
regenerated. Therefore, we prefer to use NS-2 only to generate the
flash worm traffic and run the detection mechanism on the postanalyzer.

39

4. Tests and Results
In this section we explain our testing setup and provide an analysis on the result.

4.1. Generate flash worm traffic
Flash worm traffic was generated by running NS-2 simulator with following
parameters:
•

Configurable Parameters:
o Number of clusters = 10
o Infection number = 2

•

We disabled the detection mechanism of the simulator. If the detection
mechanism is disabled, NS-2 automatically outputs all the flash worm traffic
data into a text file.

•

Traffic Format:
o The traffic is organized by the following fields:


Event Time (in ms), Node Address, Parent Node Address, Target
Address Size

o Each field is separated by a space.
o For example, Fig. 9 displays the first five flash worm data.
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line
line
line
line
line

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

0.1 128 0 1279
19.2 768 128 639
19.2 129 128 638
28.8 769 768 318
28.8 1088 768 319

<Fig. 9: Sample Flash Worm Traffic>



Line 1 has the initial flash worm data. The line “0.1 128 0 1279”
means “Node 128 was infected by Node 0 at time 0.1 and the
target address size is 1279”. Since we simulate 10 clusters and
each cluster has 128 nodes, the initial hit-list size of 1279 is
correct.



Line 2 and 3 shows that Node 128 correctly infected 2 other
nodes at 19.2 ms. Note that the target address list is divided into
639 and 638 and distributed to Nodes 768 and 129 respectively.



Since our simulation does not utilize threads, the node has to wait
until it receives all the target addresses from its parent. From line
1 and 2, we can see that it took 19.2 – 0.1 = 19.1 ms to transmit
target list size of 639 from Node 128 to Node 768. Also, from
line 2 and line 4, we can see that it took 28.8 – 19.2 = 9.6 ms to
transmit target list size of 318 from Node 768 to Node 769.
Therefore, a higher propagation delay is required to transmit a
larger target list.
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4.2. Plot and analyze flash worm traffic
After generating the flash worm traffic, we plotted and analyzed the traffic using
our post-analyzer.

•

Spread Tree Topology
o Fig. 10 displays all the 1280 target nodes organized into a spread tree
topology.

<Fig. 10: Complete Tree>
Without Pruning



In this test setup, there is no pruning because we specified
sufficiently long pruning time period to display the complete tree
structure.
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o Fig. 11 displays a zoomed-in screen shot. It also shows a tooltip, which
describes the detailed information regarding Node 854.

<Fig. 11: Zoomed-in and ToolTip>

•

Running detection method
o Fig. 12 shows that our detection method found the spread of flash worms.
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<Fig. 12: Detection Mechanism in Action>

o For the detection method parameters, Prune Time is set to 3.5630 and
Threshold Depth is set to 5.
o The nodes and lines marked in blue color indicate the pruned entities. In
the above example, the first 3 generations have been pruned.

4.3. Plot and analyze the actual internet traffic captured from Lawrence National
Laboratory
•

In the previous experiment, we tested that our detection mechanism can
successfully detect the spread of flash worms. However, we were also
interested to find out how the detection mechanism would respond to other
kinds of network traffics.
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•

Instead of generating various Internet traffics as we generated the flash worm
traffic, we decided to use an archived Internet trace data from [9]. Captured
from the Lawrence National Laboratory using tcpdump of real WAN traffic, the
trace data went through a sanitization script to renumber IP addresses and to
remove all private packet contents. The sanitization script also separated TCP
traffic from UDP traffic and places them into different files. One can capture
one’s own Internet traffic using tcpdump and use the same sanitization script to
produce the similar trace data.

•

Traffic Format:
o The traffic is organized by the following fields:


Timestamp of packet arrival, Source host, Destination host,
Source port, Destination port, Packet size

o We modified our post-analyzer to use above fields to create spread trees.
o We did not utilize the port numbers to create different spread trees for
different port number. However, in a real world deployment of our
detection mechanism, the spread trees should be further separated by the
port number because flash worms will probably use a specific port
number to spread.

•

TCP Traffic
o The spread tree formulation of the TCP traffic is shown in Fig. 13. Even
though more than 150 packet events were processed, there were many
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attempts to create loops or to create repetitive relationships. The
attempts to create loop were avoided and the attempts to recreate
existing parent-child relationship were ignored. Therefore, we did not
see rapid growth of the spread tree.
o The tree structure seemed to be the reserved formulation of the flash
worm spread tree. The total number of nodes in a generation decreases
as generation number increases. However, the exact opposite happens in
flash worm spread tree.

<Fig. 13: Spread Tree of TCP traffic>

•

UDP Traffic
o In TCP traffic, many network communications were between 2 nodes.
However, in UDP traffic, we saw more interactions among different
nodes. See Fig. 14.
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o This time we processed about 300 packet events, but still it only created
5 generations.

<Fig. 14: Spread Tree of UDP traffic >

4.4. Breaking our detection mechanism
From the previous section, we saw that typical Internet traffic is not likely to trigger
false detection alarms. However, there are ways to break our detection mechanism:
•

Slow down the infection process
o Because nodes are pruned periodically, slowing down the infection
process with respect to the pruning period, the depth of the spread tree
may not grow rapidly.
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•

Use customized source and destination addresses
o Because our current implementation does not allow loops in the tree,
customized packets can be transmitted in a way that makes the valid
flash worm packets to be ignored. For example, before sending a packet
to infect a node from next generation, source and destination address
fields can be switched to create a reverse parent-child relation in the tree
first. When the actual flash worm packet is processed later, it will
attempt to create a loop and will be removed.
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5. Conclusion
In this project, we developed a simulator to generate flash worm traffic. We, then,
developed an analyzer that can run our proposed geometric-based detection mechanism on
the traffic. Our results show that the detection mechanism can be sensitive to the presence
of the flash worm traffic while maintaining insensitivity to other regular internet traffics.
Working closely with the packet classification products, we believe that our detection
mechanism can successfully identify the spread of flash worms.
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6. Future Work

First of all, to increase the maximum number of nodes simulated, a different version
of NS simulator can be used. PDNS, for example, is a network simulator that can support
parallel and distributed simulation over multiple PCs. The need to simulate larger network
topology may arise when testing our detection mechanism on a shallow spread tree
topology. Our current maximum of 10,000 nodes is not sufficient to create flash worm
traffics with a high infection number. For example, if each host infects 10 other hosts, it
only takes 4 generations to infect all 10,000 nodes.

Secondly, to reduce the occurrence of false alarms, more components can be used to
identify the unique characteristic of the flash worm spread tree. In our current construction
of spread tree, we only use depth as the determining factor to decide whether an outbreak of
flash worm has occurred. However, studies can be conducted to find other factors. For
example, there is a pattern that the total number of nodes in a generation increases from a
generation to the next. It follows the form XG, where X is the maximum infection number
and G is the generation number. Such pattern may be use to reduce false alarms.

Also, in another effort to reduce the false alarms, research can be done on
integrating the packet classification technology into our detection mechanism. The ultimate
goal is to help identify the well known application traffic patterns so that the known “safe”
network traffic would not be processed into a spread tree. As an example, we suspect that
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peer-to-peer traffic is likely to trigger false alarms because of the many parent-child
relationships amongst a vast number of peers. If the packet classification technology can
identify a peer-to-peer traffic, then the traffic would not be processed by our detection
mechanism, which would reduce the chance of incorrect detections.
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